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SIGNIFICANT LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
ANTITRUST LAW
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE MERGING OF LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS, by Derek C. Bok, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (December 1960).
The purpose of Professor Bok's article is to suggest ways in
which law and economics might make common cause in determining
how Section 7 can best be applied to mergers between competing
firms. His exhaustive research on the problem leads him not only
to a study of the legislative history of the Act but also into an
examination of current economic theory on the effects of merger.
lie argues that the present approaches to the construction of
Section 7 are inadequate and concludes that the interpretation of
that section must be based, in particular contexts, upon a single
significant factor as the standard of legality.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, forbids any corporation from
absorbing all or any part of another company "where the effect thereof may
be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly."
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet had serious occasion
to consider a test which can validly be used in the application of that Sec-
tion. The legislative history of the Act is chiefly important for the common
values and apprehensions which were expressed by so many who stood for
the bill. As a practical guide, however, it fails to yield much concrete as-
sistance beyond an occasional suggestion of rather vague dimensions. Pro-
fessor Bok, attempting to find some solutions in terms of economic theory,
considers studies based both upon empirical knowledge and theoretical
analysis.
He found that these studies fall short of revealing the consequence of
many mergers. He finds no theoretical treatment which suggests that factors,
such as the importance or strategic value of the commodity produced, the
number of men employed, the total assets of the corporation, etc., could be
woven together into a consistent whole. There has been no method sug-
gested for integrating these factors into an economic theory in a manner
susceptible of systematic legal application under a statute concerned with
all the varying consequences of mergers.
Finding no assistance in either the legislative history or economic theory,
Professor Bak discusses the three different constructions of Section 7 which
have been advanced:
1. The approach of the Government, that is, the quantitative sub-
stantiality doctrine. Transplanted into Section 7, the quantitative substan-
tiality doctrine would seemingly imply that any horizontal merger could
be struck down on a showing that the acquired firm sold a substantial
share—perhaps some six to seven percent—of goods in the relevant market.
2. The approach of the defendant. Under this interpretation of
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Section 7, the result would be in favor of the defendant in any case in
which the probable consequences of a merger cannot be ascertained, on the
ground that the Government has simply failed to meet its burden of proof.
The essence of this approach lies in an attempt to capitalize upon the
defects in our present knowledge about mergers.
3. The approach of the Attorney General's Committee. This approach,
which supposedly is the position of the "expert," recoils from any concep-
tual grossness of the quantitative substantiality doctrine, at least where the
market share of the acquired firm is not extremely large. Instead, a flexible
approach is recommended in which "different factors may be equally
important" and no one pattern of proof can meet the requirements of all
cases. Factors which might be considered are "long-run supply and
demand picture," "the incentive of sellers or potential sellers to enter new
markets and to improve their products or services," "adjustment by other
companies to the actual and expected shifts in markets affected" and the
"opportunities for innovation in products . . . or methods of sale." The
striking aspect of this approach is that there is a lack of any suggestion as
to the manner in which these factors may be applied in any given case.
The author shows how each one of these tests fails to achieve its goal
and, in fact, impedes effectuation of congressional policy. He argues that
there is much to be said for a single significant factor which can at least
be fairly and inexpensively administered in a fashion that is understandable
to the businessman contemplating merger. This most meaningful single
factor in appraising a merger by the largest firm is the extent to which
that merger has increased the superiority in the leader's size beyond the
margin of superiority enjoyed during a base period prior to the merger.
The author develops this theme fully, showing when additional factors
might have to be taken into account and when an exception would have to
be carved out.
The situation most commonly arising under Section 7 is that of an
acquisition by a firm that is not the largest but only one of the largest
companies in the market. Professor Bok argues that the most logical test
to employ would be one based upon increases in concentration. The court
or agency should look to the change that has taken place in the aggregate
share possessed by the largest firms in the market. The number of firms
selected for this purpose should be large enough to include the acquiring
firm but should not be unreasonably large (more than eight firms). The
merger should then be disallowed if the aggregate share following the
acquisition substantially exceeds (by seven or eight percentage points or
more) the aggregate share of the market controlled by the same number
of firms at any time during a period reasonably (five to ten years) prior
to the acquisition. The author concludes his article with a discussion of
other factors which have been suggested for use in cases arising under
Section 7:
1. The nature of competition in the market.
2. Growth and other dynamic factors.
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3. Vertical effects of the merger.
4. Competitive advantages of the merging firms.
5. Prior acquisitions by the merging firms.
A separate section is devoted to the failing company defense.
The value of Professor Bok's article rests upon his successful attempt
to fuse law and economic theory in order to achieve an intelligible standard
with which to construe Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
THEODORE C. REGNANTE
CORPORATIONS
DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE INSIDERS WHO PURCHASE SHARES,
by Michael Conant, 46 Cornell L.Q. 53 (Fall 1960).
Professor Conant examines the question of whether a cor-
porate officer or director who purchases outstanding shares in his
firm has an affirmative fiduciary duty of disclosure to the selling
shareholder. The factual basis of the corporate insiders fiduciary
duties to his corporation and the arguments for extending the duty
of disclosure to the individual shareholder are discussed and ana-
lyzed, as is the impact of Federal legislation in this area. Specific
legislation is recommended since the traditional remedies of the
courts will not suffice to solve the problem.
The majority of decisions have held that there is no fiduciary duty
upon the insider to make affirmative disclosures to individual shareholders
of facts which may affect the value of the stock, obtained by virtue of his
position with the company, in the absence of actual fraud. Since the insider
is not dealing with the corpus of his trust, the corporate management,
property and business opportunities, the courts see no reason for extending
the fiduciary duty to the individual shareholder. The law of fraud demands
honest and complete answers to questions asked by the seller, but the
burden of disclosing the facts should not rest on the insider absent inquiry.
The minority-rule courts hold that the insider is a fiduciary of each
individual stockholder and must disclose all material or special circumstances
within his knowledge that might have a bearing on the value of the stock,
and are not readily available in the corporations books or financial reports.
Most of the cases decided by these courts could have been founded on
common law fraud or a duty of trust arising from another source. The
author maintains that insiders should be held to account to the corporation
for all profit gained through use of corporate information but that this
remedy cannot be extended to the individual shareholder on a theory sound-
ing in trust.
Section 16B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 bolsters the author's
contention that the fiduciary duty of the corporate insider is owed to the
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